SOUNDING BOARD is an outlet for opinions on good and crazy things going on at home (wherever I may be). All are welcome. You are not expected to bring anything except your common sense & sense of humor.
'If the automobile had followed the same development cycle as the computer, a Rolls-Royce would today cost $100, get one million miles to the gallon, and explode once a year, killing everyone inside.'
-Robert X. Cringely (from geek wisdom)
SOUNDING BOARD
Monday, June 30, 2003
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On women and parliamentary politics
There are now, more than ever, a lot of efforts on increasing women’s political participation, particularly in decision-making positions. I find it intellectually amusing to find a few good (and short!) papers asking the most basic yet important questions on the topic. One of these papers has been written by Sandra Grey (Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University). Ms. Grey’s paper focuses on the ‘critical mass’ argument that claims that ‘women will only impact upon political decisions once they achieve a critical mass within legislative bodies’ (Grey, S. 2001. WOMEN AND PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS: Does Size Matter? Critical Mass and Women MP in New Zealand House of Representatives. Paper for the 51st Political Studies Association Conference, 10-12 April 2001, Manchester, United Kingdom [online]. Available at: http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2001/Grey%20Sandra.pdf [Accessed 27 June 2003].). She tested the argument through a case study on New Zealand House of Representatives.
In answering the question (Does size matter?), Ms. Grey has this to say:
‘In the New Zealand case there was evidence of increased feminization of the political agenda at a time when the gender balance in the House of representatives rose to almost reach Kanter’s skewed ratio of 15:85. Female politicians were more actively involved in debates on child care and parental leave and spoke more proudly of their gender and their intent to represent women as a group once they reached 14.4 per cent of the seats in the New Zealand parliament…. It seems that in order to impact upon the New Zealand parliamentary agenda and the parts of the political culture centred on self-perception, size does matter….While women had made significant advancements since 1975 in terms of overall parliamentary representation in New Zealand, until the 1999 election the number of females in cabinet (the powerhouse for policy making) was marginal. Even in 1996, only one woman sat in cabinet. There was evidence that low proportions of women in Government ranks prevented women impacting on public policy’.
The paper notes the importance of the concept of critical mass in terms of women’s political participation. Ms. Grey also emphasizes in the end that ‘…what we should talk about is different critical masses – dependent on what we want to achieve through group representation.’
It should be interesting to test the robustness of the findings in other country's context. And perhaps to complete the picture, in addition to the critical mass argument, we should consider the impact of interest group politics on the critical mass of women in decision-making positions. Operationally, the critical mass argument is very much linked to interest groups’ influence in decision-making. It is necessary to integrate the interplay of critical mass in government and outside of government (interest groups) and how such interaction influences the policy agenda – of women in position, and of those in power in general.
posted by Allan at 11:53 AM (GMT+8)
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SOUNDING BOARD
Sunday, June 22, 2003
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To change or not to change
Malacanang is going full blast on charter change, says Bert Gonzales, the President's adviser on special concerns. Despite the President's non-committal stance, Gonzales et al target to amend the Constitution before the President steps down in 2004, with the incoming President to serve as a transition President.
The current presidential system indeed has its loopholes, lots of them. However, these loopholes are rooted more in the people behind the system rather than the system itself. This is probably the most widely used, abused and misused argument but still the most valid. Call it politics of patronage, interest group politics, or any other term. Unless a system is backed up with a critical mass and a strong and independent judicial system, no country is going anywhere. In a country where the gullible majority decides the outcome of elections based on popularity of candicates and implicit or explicit endorsement of church leaders, and where justice is delayed from simple theft to corruption and plunder, it is not very difficult to get cynical. This must be why some would like the change to happen not earlier than 2010.
We have to distinguish what makes a system work. When we have resolved the fundamental parameters, then, and only then, should we ponder on charter change.
posted by Allan at 9:04 AM (GMT+8)
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SOUNDING BOARD
Sunday, June 15, 2003
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Featured software: UC Berkeley's The National Budget Simulation
The National Budget Simulation was created in 1995 by Anders Schneiderman and Nathan Newman, then co-directors of UC-Berkeley's Center for Community Economic Research. The simulation allows web users get a sense of the balancing act involve in coming up with the national budget of US.
I must say this is a very interesting and informative piece of software. Some of us may find it useful for teaching exercises and even workshops.
I had a problem getting into the details of what the budget category includes. I encountered errors after clicking the linked categories. Having no way of knowing the coverage of categories, I assume that official development assistance is included in 'international affairs'? I wonder what other things are included in that category.
I may be very naive but I hope some sort of a generic software counterpart (wherein we could edit the categories and assumptions so we can tailor-fit the simulation within specific country settings) may be developed. Yes, that would be quite naive. Two words: copyright and money.
Lastly, budgets of different countries are always influenced by lobby groups and priorities and political leanings of the current administration. It maybe be more interesting (and useful without taking away the simplicity of the technology) to factor in these political contraints. For example, if a lobby group is quite influential in one budget category, the web user is limited to a certain range (so as not to lessen the unpopularity of a budget cut for instance).
Congress, which is composed of the Upper House (Senate) and the Lower House (Congress), acts through their respective congressional oversight committees in seeing to it that agencies implement the policies that they enact. Congress and the agencies encounter a principal-agent problem, i.e., a problem that arises when an agent (agencies) pursues its own goals, which are not consistent with that of the principal (congress). In some cases, these hearings are political posturing (Cameron, C.M. and Rosendorf B.P., 1993. A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight. Games and Economic Behavior [online], 5 (1). Available from: http://www.idealibrary.com/links/toc/game/5/1/0 [Accessed 24 March 2002].). This is an opportunity for legislators to make a good impression or get media’s attention. However, in some cases, these hearings are signals that reveal their priorities. This is the case being shown here.
The relationship between congress and agencies may be adequately explained by game theory, particularly by the 'congressional hearing game', the principles of which are based on 'The Auditing Game' in (Rasmusen, E., 2001. Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.). The game is played by 2 players – legislature and agencies. Congress plays the principal while government agencies play the agent. Congress convenes oversight committee hearings to check if they agencies are complying with the policy. Agencies are required to attend the hearings and be subject to the committee’s inquiry. Print and TV media cover the committee hearings. Therefore, they have two strategies each. For congress, it decides whether to conduct hearings or not. For agencies, they decide whether to comply with the policy or not. The game is continuous, with congress as the first mover, i.e., signaling its resoluteness in seeing to it that agencies comply. The payoffs are ordered as: {congress, agencies}.
In the absence of a direct sanction, the public hearings conducted by the legislature can function as deterrent to non-compliance. There is no Nash equilibrium here, i.e., a situation where neither player wishes to change strategies as neither one of them gains by doing so. Upon receiving feedback, congress convenes public hearings and agencies comply with the policy (hearing, comply). Congress gains good publicity as well as agencies. Civil society groups and the public at large will view them as “doing their job” and hence giving due attention to women’s issues. However, Congress could not afford to conduct committee hearings on this particular policy all the time. Hence, the conduct of a hearing sends a signal of resoluteness of Congress to pursue the issue. When agencies start complying, Congress shifts back to 'no hearing'. This situation - wherein Congress does not call agencies to a committee hearing or inquiry and agencies comply – is an ideal situation. Unfortunately, when agencies realize that Congress is not conducting committee hearings, the deterrent function of hearings is relaxed. Therefore, agencies have an incentive not to comply, or, stating it in another way, non-compliance is not penalized with any (proxy) 'sanction'. When compliance falls again, Congress begins to show resoluteness on this issue, and the cycle goes on (please refer to broken arrows). The 'equilibrium' here is in mixed strategies. The best strategy for Congress, for example, is to conduct hearings from time to time only, given that it is costly for them to conduct hearings all the time. The best strategy for the agencies is to comply all the time, but as soon as congress stops conducting hearings, agencies have a bigger payoff if they do not comply. The broken arrows show the movement of mixed strategies.
The analysis above assumes that the agencies’ payoff (pegged to -1) is not so high that will deter the agencies from not complying. If the cost of complying is so high for some agencies (assume greater than F), then the movements will be different. Simply put, even the threat of being subjected to a committee hearing will not deter non-compliance. In which scenario is this possible?
The budget quota (gender budget quota amounting to 5% of agencies' budget) is a regarded as a prized victory of the women’s movement in the Philippines. Therefore, any proposal to scrap the quota is not politically acceptable given the dynamic civil society in the Philippines. This is fine insofar as the operational definition of compliance (i.e., submission of plans) is maintained. If it is extended to cover meeting the quota, most agencies will have difficulty in complying. This will reflect a lower compliance rate. For example, among the 123 agencies which complied in 2000, only 33 agencies allocated at least five percent of their total budgets to gender concerns. In our game matrix above, if the cost of compliance is higher, hearings will not be a deterrent. Ultimately, even congress may decide not to conduct hearings at all if they see no effect on overall compliance.
posted by Allan at 6:54 AM (GMT+8)
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