SOUNDING BOARD is an outlet for opinions on good and crazy things going on at home (wherever I may be). All are welcome. You are not expected to bring anything except your common sense & sense of humor.
'If the automobile had followed the same development cycle as the computer, a Rolls-Royce would today cost $100, get one million miles to the gallon, and explode once a year, killing everyone inside.'
-Robert X. Cringely (from geek wisdom)
SOUNDING BOARD
Friday, May 23, 2003
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'I think I should stick to that decision' --- President Gloria Arroyo
Since December 2002, President Gloria Arroyo has been denying categorically that she will run for 2004. It seems the cloud of doubt has no other business but to follow her.
This was brought to the fore again when she gave a 'no comment' answer to a question abotu her plans for 2004 (elections). An in a press conference during the State Visit to US President George Bush, Ms. Macapagal gave this answer when asked what could change her mind, "You know I feel so comfortable (about) not being a candidate for president. I'd been able to make so many unpopular but correct decisions so I think I should stick to that decision," (INQ7.net 22 May 2004).
I called it 'feigned retreat' tactic before, borrowing from an unusual war strategy to catch your opponents off-guard by implying a retreat, while building up for a massive attack, and ultimately defeating the enemy (Alexander, B., How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror 2002.). I still believe it is. Note the change in tone from 'I'm not running...' to 'No comment' to 'I think I should stick to that decision'. And note too that she did not say she WILL stick to her decision. She said she thinks she should (stick to her decision).
SOUNDING BOARD
Monday, May 19, 2003
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IMF Working Paper: Gender-Responsive Government Budgeting
The abstract of the working paper states:
“This paper examines the concept of gender-responsive government budgeting, promoted in recent years by women’s nongovernmental organizations, academia, and multilateral organizations, and the extent of its implementation by national governments in both advanced and developing countries. Owing to recently developed analytical and technical tools, government budget management systems in some countries can help promote gender equality – the extent of government involvement in gender-sensitive sectors and programs – at any level of available funding. However, to be fully effective, obstacles such as gender-biased culture, the lack of appropriate budget classifications, and the lack of gender analysis expertise and gender-disaggregated data in most countries need to be addressed.” (Sarraf F. 2003. Gender-Responsive Government Budgeting. IMF Working Paper 03/83)
The paper is laudable insofar as it explains gender-responsive government budgeting, discusses the tools for its implementation, and assesses its the scope and practicality. It also describes the political, technical and financial support provided by multilateral organizations to national governments. Personally, I think any additional focus on gender-responsive government budgeting is very much welcome. At the very least, it generates awareness from a wider audience on its policy and program implications, as well as its intended benefits.
Having said those points, let me also stress that the paper is more focused on the tools and technical nuances that are necessary for gender-responsive government budgeting to be effective and operational. In view of this, the paper’s analysis missed the critical role of the political environment (including the different stakeholders) and the necessary strategies to manage such environment. The management of the political processes and stakeholders is a crucial factor that separates an operational gender-responsive budgeting policy from one that is ‘good only in paper’ (One may even argue that there is no such thing as a policy good only in paper because if it is, then it missed the critical role of the bigger political environment. Such policy, in effect, may be considered ‘bad on paper’ from the very start.).
First, the paper assumes ‘that there is strong will and commitment to use the government budget, among other policy instruments, to promote gender mainstreaming…’ (a very dangerous – maybe even useless – assumption indeed!). Gender budgeting is a tool to address women’s needs and rights, and in so doing, seeks to change gender roles - socially differentiated roles which limit participation of women (and men), politically, economically and socially. It is important to note that the operationalization of gender budgeting should maximize support and minimize resistance. Often, if not always, the political will (of the current leadership and government as a whole) to go into gender budgeting is not there. If it is, then we should be able to see a better picture of gender budgeting in most, if not all, countries.
Second, the paper also assumes the existence of a ‘built-in rigidity in government budget structures’ in both advanced and developing countries that limits the capacity of government budgeting in addressing cross-sectoral concerns and issues. Perhaps this flows from the initial assumption that a strong will and commitment exist. Given such ambitious assumption, it seems that the next step is to blame the rigidity of the budgetary structures for the inadequacies of gender budgeting.
The more critical questions are: If we take these two things given – resistance to gender budgeting and rigidity of the budgetary structures – how do we operationalize gender budgeting? Specifically, how do we manage the resistance (and indifference) of those agencies who are supposed to be on the forefront of gender budgeting? Given the rigidity of the budgetary structures, how do we make the structures and processes transparent and accountable to the citizens who are supposedly the intended beneficiaries of the budgeted government programs and projects? How do we maximize civil society participation and checks and balances (role of congress perhaps for carrots and sticks)?
The paper did mention the value of analyses of impacts on beneficiaries and households (even this level of analysis is gender-blind to a certain extent) and redirecting budgetary allocation in the next budgeting cycle toward addressing gender issues. However, it overemphasized the technical aspect by saying, ‘the results of the surveys and debates would only be useful (emphasis supplied) if they could be integrated into a specific budget classification’. Perhaps a more accountable and transparent way of using the budget and getting around its rigidity is to ensure that it results to programs that correct gender imbalances. Budgets should be analyzed, and the resulting analyses should be used for lobbying for changes in budgetary priorities – regardless of the budget classification. In the end, what matters most are not the classifications under which programs are funded. What matters is whether or not the government budget responds to the needs and priorities of its constituents.
In the advent of performance-based budgeting, most countries now have a very potent tool in their hands to hold leaders and government agencies accountable and responsive to their contituents’ needs and priorities. We now have a way to link government budget and priorities – including the availability of succeeding budgetary outlays based on previous ‘performance’. The crucial question that we all should be vigilant about is how to make performance-based budgeting more participatory as we go on.
Perhaps in addition to the oversimplified assumptions, the title of the paper limits the analysis. Gender budgeting is not only a government activity. It is not government budgeting in a strict sense. When one emphasizes the government part of it, as in ‘gender-responsive government budgeting’, it is not very difficult to get bogged down to the so-called ‘rigidity’ of the budgetary process. Gender budgeting is a participatory method by which we hold our leaders accountable to our needs and priorities. It is a process where we, ourselves, can ask even the most basic questions such as, ‘how much is going to this and that project, or whether such projects even exist in the pipeline’. Basic questions that provide valuable information to us, women and men. Basic questions that serve as our handle in participating in ‘government' decisions affecting our day-to-day lives.
posted by Allan at 12:49 PM (GMT+8)
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SOUNDING BOARD
Friday, May 09, 2003
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Revisiting Abu Sayyaf-military collusion: same old story
President Gloria Arroyo ordered an investigation on the claim of Gracia Burnham that there was collusion between the military and Abu Sayyaf. This is like instructing someone to find a needle in the haystack - blindfolded.
Gracia Burnham was one of the American hostages take by the Abu Sayyaf in 2001. After her release, she published 'In the Presence of My Enemies' which describes her experiences as one of the hostages.
When an order to investigate is accompanied with an expression of confidence with the military, one doubts the objectivity of such a process. In addition, let us not be fooled by this sudden 'get-to-the-bottom-of-this attitude' by Malacanang as if this is a new issue.
'The Muslim community on Basilan is especially sceptical of the US role there, because they argue that the Philippines military is at least as much to blame for the endemic violence on their island as the various rebel groups. They point out several occasions on which the military appears to have colluded with, rather than fought, Abu Sayyaf - notably in June 2001 in the town of Lamitan. At the time the Abu Sayyaf faction holding the two American hostages and several Filipinos was surrounded - but troops were ordered to pull back and at the same time a large quantity of cash was handed over to the rebels to get two of the Filipinos released. The Abu Sayyaf gunmen slipped away, and held on to their American captives until the botched rescue attempt a year later.'
'Salonga has publicly stated that the Abu Sayyaf is a group of common criminals covered already under civil law. They have not been dealt with because of corruption. Payoffs are made to the local government and military by the Abu Sayyaf using some of the huge kidnap ransoms they collect.'
In October of the same year, the House Committee on National Defense cleared the military of the alleged collusion with Abu Sayyaf and dismissed the allegations as mere 'speculations'. Have the recommendations of the Committee been acted upon by Malacanang and the concerned agencies? Senator Ramon Magsaysay Jr., chair of the defense committee, stressed that since the committee submitted its report in August last year, 'the concerned agencies had yet to say what they have done' to the recommendations.
Make no mistake about it. This collusion issue has been with us for quite some time now. So will this new investigation lead us closer to the truth? I hope so, but only if Malacanang displays political will - if ever it has one.
posted by Allan at 11:48 AM (GMT+8)
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SOUNDING BOARD
Monday, May 05, 2003
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Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development Policies to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism
This study examines development policies by three countries - Israel, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom - to inhibit the resurgence of terrorist violence [emphasis supplied]. It highlights the benefits and shortcomings of using social and economic development as a way to counter terrorism. In the Philippines' case, the study assessed the 1996 Davao Consensus, which created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Minadanao (ARMM).
With respect to the Philippines, some conclusions deserve to be highlighted. The study concludes that social and economic development can discourage terrorist recruits. However, when inadequately funded, such programs are likely to discourage local communities and renew support for violence. The study also emphasizes the downside of having poor (preparation and) implementation of programs - especially when large-scale projects were undertaken without community-based needs assessment. In simple terms, the Philippine government implemented the projects they wanted, not the projects the communities needed. Finally, the study ended by saying that 'development policies alone do not eliminate terrorism'. They are most effective when integrated into a wider socio-political context.
The study should be commended for identifying 'generic' lessons - the upsides and downsides in using development as a counterterrorism tool. After reading the report from cover to cover, however, one is left wondering whether the authors have some idea on how to operationalize the lessons learned. For example, more than community-based needs assessments, what facets of social mobilization and/or community organizing should be looked into so that the women and men in the community would feel they are the driving force, and not just some passive recipients of mana from the central government, or from a foreign government or organization?
As a matter of framework, there are three things that should go into any counterterrorism strategy - social and economic development (specifically, poverty alleviation), military strategy (including reforms in the military), and a third component I call the 'soft approach' to counterterrorism --- trust-building through community organizing and advocacy.
Of course, there is a big difference between terrorism and insurgency. MNLF is not a terrorist group. One would expect RAND to know better because it published a paper on 'Trends on Outside Support for Insurgent Movements' where it distinguished insurgency from terrorism. In contrast to terrorirm, insurgency has a distinct aim to 'create an alternative government capable of controlling a given area' (Byman, Chalk, et al. 2001. Trends on Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. RAND.). Let's just assume that this is one honest mistake.
Having made that distinction (lest I be accused of not knowing the difference, excuse me), I hope that President Arroyo's 'Mindanao Natin' is not mana from central government. I hope it is not just a compilation of existing efforts, spiced up with one or two new government programs. Hope. That is what one can do, especially if one knows that the issue lies deeper and more basic than just development and peace - LAND.
posted by Allan at 8:09 AM (GMT+8)
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