SOUNDING BOARD is an outlet for opinions on good and crazy things going on at home (wherever I may be). All are welcome. You are not expected to bring anything except your common sense & sense of humor.
'If the automobile had followed the same development cycle as the computer, a Rolls-Royce would today cost $100, get one million miles to the gallon, and explode once a year, killing everyone inside.'
-Robert X. Cringely (from geek wisdom)
SOUNDING BOARD
Monday, May 05, 2003
_____________________________________________
Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development Policies to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism
This study examines development policies by three countries - Israel, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom - to inhibit the resurgence of terrorist violence [emphasis supplied]. It highlights the benefits and shortcomings of using social and economic development as a way to counter terrorism. In the Philippines' case, the study assessed the 1996 Davao Consensus, which created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Minadanao (ARMM).
With respect to the Philippines, some conclusions deserve to be highlighted. The study concludes that social and economic development can discourage terrorist recruits. However, when inadequately funded, such programs are likely to discourage local communities and renew support for violence. The study also emphasizes the downside of having poor (preparation and) implementation of programs - especially when large-scale projects were undertaken without community-based needs assessment. In simple terms, the Philippine government implemented the projects they wanted, not the projects the communities needed. Finally, the study ended by saying that 'development policies alone do not eliminate terrorism'. They are most effective when integrated into a wider socio-political context.
The study should be commended for identifying 'generic' lessons - the upsides and downsides in using development as a counterterrorism tool. After reading the report from cover to cover, however, one is left wondering whether the authors have some idea on how to operationalize the lessons learned. For example, more than community-based needs assessments, what facets of social mobilization and/or community organizing should be looked into so that the women and men in the community would feel they are the driving force, and not just some passive recipients of mana from the central government, or from a foreign government or organization?
As a matter of framework, there are three things that should go into any counterterrorism strategy - social and economic development (specifically, poverty alleviation), military strategy (including reforms in the military), and a third component I call the 'soft approach' to counterterrorism --- trust-building through community organizing and advocacy.
Of course, there is a big difference between terrorism and insurgency. MNLF is not a terrorist group. One would expect RAND to know better because it published a paper on 'Trends on Outside Support for Insurgent Movements' where it distinguished insurgency from terrorism. In contrast to terrorirm, insurgency has a distinct aim to 'create an alternative government capable of controlling a given area' (Byman, Chalk, et al. 2001. Trends on Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. RAND.). Let's just assume that this is one honest mistake.
Having made that distinction (lest I be accused of not knowing the difference, excuse me), I hope that President Arroyo's 'Mindanao Natin' is not mana from central government. I hope it is not just a compilation of existing efforts, spiced up with one or two new government programs. Hope. That is what one can do, especially if one knows that the issue lies deeper and more basic than just development and peace - LAND.
posted by Allan at 8:09 AM (GMT+8)
permalink (URL of this post) ::
